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Abstract
This paper examines China’s considerations in reaching the 2004 and 2007 Air Service
Agreement Protocols with the United States (US) and the impacts of such policy on the
China-US market from the perspective of China. Analysis shows that the 2004 and the 2007
Protocols have profound impacts on the China-US market. The two Protocols have been
associated with phenomenal traffic growth and intensified competition. Passengers also
benefit from much more choice in terms of both airlines and routing. Over time, Chinese
carriers’ operating performance and financial performance have gradually improved after the
liberalization expressed in the Protocols. However, the industry’s hub-building initiatives are
still seriously challenged by competing hubs in Seoul and Tokyo which have diverted
substantial number of passengers moving between the China and US markets. Such issues
have to be addressed in order to create a win-win outcome for both countries.
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1. Introduction
Since the first Open Skies agreement was signed between the United States (US) and the
Netherlands in 1978, the US has been making every possible effort to expand its Open Skies
partners around the world. China, as one of the fastest growing aviation markets and
economies, as well as US’s key trading partner, is among its top priorities. The years 2004
and 2007 represented significant breakthroughs in US-China negotiations with two Protocols
being signed which radically liberalized traffic rights arrangements between the two countries
1 Corresponding author. Tel 00 44 1234 754247
E-Mail address: frankie.oconnell@cranfield.ac.uk
2and transformed what was a highly restrictive bilateral regime to a more liberal market. This
paper examines China’s considerations in reaching the 2004 and 2007 protocols and the
impacts of such policy on the China-US aviation market, as seen from the perspective of
China. The study contributes to the literature on liberalization by providing much needed
insights into the liberalization between the two largest aviation markets in the world. The rest
of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews China’s policy and experience of
domestic deregulation and international liberalization. Section 3 examines the evolution of
the China-US air service agreements. Section 4 analyses China’s considerations in reaching
the 2004 and 2007 Protocols. Section 5 assesses the impacts of the two protocols from
China’s perspective. And finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. China’s Policy and Experience of Domestic Deregulation and International
Liberalization
Founded in early 1950s, China’s airline industry was controlled by the military through the
Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC), a division of the Air Force. This
organization was then separated from the military and became a civilian authority directly
under the State Council of China in 1980, with six regional administrative bureaus created at
the same time. Between 1980 and 1986, CAAC acted not only as an industry regulator, but
also as the owner of the country’s sole airline (CAAC) engaged in its day-to-day operations.
All aspects of the industry, such as market entry, route authority, frequencies, fare, aircraft
purchasing, funding and even passenger eligibility for taking flights, heavily controlled by
this government agency (Zhang and Chen, 2003). Such a centralized system was challenged
by the rapid air traffic growth starting from the mid-1980s, and the industry was
decentralized with a number of new airlines established and various reforms taking place
after 1986. A particular noteworthy reform was airline consolidation in 2002 where nine
CAAC-controlled airlines were consolidated into three airline groups, namely, Air China,
China Eastern and China Southern airlines. After the 2002 airline consolidation, the Chinese
government gradually deregulated the domestic market; carriers were given greater freedom
on route entry and more power to determine their own airfares (Lei and O’Connell, 2011).
During this process, CAAC completed its own transformation from both a regulator and an
operator to a pure industry watchdog.
As airline consolidation was completed in 2005, CAAC also removed its restrictions on
private investment for domestic airlines. By the end of 2008, CAAC approved 14 new
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investors (Lei and O’Connell, 2011). The entry of the new carriers has intensified
competition in the domestic market. By the end of 2014, airlines in the domestic market in
China have enjoyed a high degree of freedom in route entry, subject to slot availability, and
are able to set prices at market determined levels. Premium fares in China were completely
deregulated in 2012, although a cap on economy class fares in the domestic market, designed
to protect consumers, was still in place in 2015.
In the international market, China was guided by a conservative policy until the late 1990s.
Its policy aim was to protect the interests of its own carriers. This was partly because air
transport was considered as a political instrument to serve China’s diplomatic needs, instead
of a strategic sector in support of the country’s economic development. Such mindset was
gradually changed as the Chinese economy became increasingly integrated into the world
economy and the country was more exposed to the outside world. In 2003, CAAC declared
China’s objective to liberalize its air transport market in a “proactive, progressive, orderly
and safeguarded” manner, and to take a proactive attitude in embracing the trend of
international liberalization. Since then, the industry regulator started to re-adjust its
international policy in support of liberalization and international cooperation, and in the first
several years took very radical steps forward. A fundamental change was that the interests of
its own carriers would no longer be the sole and exclusive criteria for the government when
negotiating traffic rights with foreign countries. At this time the key principles of CAAC’s
international air transport policy were as follows:
 To proactively embrace the trend of liberalization
 To support China’s overall diplomatic policies
 To support the national Opening-up Strategy and the objectives of social and
economic development
 To give special regard to meet the demand for international air transport required by
the country’s foreign trade and tourism
 To give special support to the western, northeast and central regions to establish and
improve their international air links
 To strike a balance among national interests, public interests and industry interests
 To promote airport hub development in China
 To enhance overall competitiveness of the whole industry. (Han, 2014)
4As a result of the application of these new perspectives by 2014, China’s international
aviation policy had the following characteristics: (1) multiple designation was allowed with
86 countries among the 115 Air Service Agreements (ASAs); (2) 27 ASAs had open route
schedules; (3) 21 ASAs have introduced unlimited capacity entitlements for 3rd and 4th
freedom traffic rights for air cargo services; (4) cargo 5th traffic rights was agreed with eight
countries (Han, 2014). China also agreed to relax pricing by adopting the “country of origin
principle” or the “double-disapproval principle” (Han, 2014). Within these policy
achievements, the 2004 Protocol with the US, and the subsequent 2007 Protocol, were the
most remarkable and were regarded as milestones in the liberalization of China’s aviation
policy. After ten years of liberalization policy negotiations, the most liberal and flexible
bilateral traffic rights regime was still the one with the US.
3. Evolution of the China-US Air Services Agreement
China and the US established diplomatic relations on 1 January, 1979. China-US aviation
links
were formally established a year later by the signing of the bilateral Air Services Agreement.
Two carriers from each side were allowed to operate on specific routes (Route A and Route
B2) as shown in Table 1. Based on that simple start six amendments were made in 1982,
1992, 1995, 1999, 2004 and 2007. Among these changes the 2004 and the 2007 Protocols
were regarded as China’s most ambitious attempts in its international liberalization efforts
and form the basis of the research outlined here.
Table 1 Highlights of China-US air services agreements in the 1980s
Items Provisions
Routes
Route A: Beijing-Shanghai-Tokyo/or another point in Japan-Honolulu-Los
Angeles-San Francisco-New York
Route B: Beijing-Guangzhou-Shanghai-Tokyo/or another point in Japan-
Honolulu/or Seattle-Los Angeles-San Francisco-Chicago
Designation Two for each side
Frequencies Two weekly frequencies for each side
Increased to six by the end of the 1980s
Source: US Department of State 1980-82. Note: Based on 1980-1982 China-US ASA
2 Specific points of Route B were not agreed until the 1982 amendment was made.
5The four years preceding the 2004 negotiations between China and the US witnessed robust
growth of bilateral travel, especially after 2001 when China joined the World Trade
Organization (WTO). There was an average 10% annual passenger growth rate, and 28% for
air cargo (DOT, 1999-2003). Driven by this booming market, US carriers were keen to
further expand their operations, but found themselves constrained by the capacity
entitlements in the existing ASA and they collectively used up all the 54 weekly frequencies
by 2001, only two years after the 1999 Protocol was signed. Faced with growing demand but
constrained by regulatory restrictions, the only solution for US carriers was to apply for
additional flights.
By contrast, Chinese carriers were less enthusiastic in providing further capacity on the
routes. One possible reason was the difference in terms of overall strength compared with
their US counterparts. The combined international operations produced by the Chinese airline
industry as a whole was approximately 10.3 billion revenue passenger miles in 2000, less
than half of that performed by either United’s or Northwest’s Pacific operations for the same
period (Meyer, 2002). Also China’s total international traffic (measured by revenue tonne
kilometres) accounted for only one eighth of that of the US side in 2002 (CAAC, 2003).
Another reason might be that Chinese carriers were pre-occupied with the lucrative domestic
market that had emerged from domestic liberalization, where the profit was much higher
compared with international operations. At the same time, the poor financial performance of
Chinese airlines in 2001, illustrated by losses totalling nearly US$10 million for the top three
carriers, made the industry even more cautious about capacity expansion, especially in the
China-US market, where the Chinese side was losing money over the years, as confirmed by
Wang Ronghu, the then Director General of CAAC’s International Department, and the
mastermind of the 2004 Protocol (Caijing, 2004). As a result, the Chinese side only
performed 44 weekly frequencies, 81% of its 54 entitlement up until the 2003 summer
schedule.
After several rounds of tough negotiations, the 2004 Protocols were eventually reached. Key
provisions are summarized in Table 2. As can be seen in the comparison between the ASAs
in 1999 and in 2004, the new Protocol was a significant development in China-US aviation
relations. Designation was increased from four to nine airlines from each side. Access points
were increased from 5 points in China and 12 points in the US for Route A (combination and
6all cargo services) to any point in China and any point in the US open to scheduled
international services. Weekly frequencies were increased by 195 (111 for all-cargo
operations and 84 for combination services) from 54 to 249 for each side by 2010 through
phased-in manner.
7Table 2 Key features of China-US air services agreements in 1999, 2004 and 2007
Key Features 1999 Protocol 2004 Protocol 2007 Protocol
Designation Four airlines from each side Nine airlines from each side by2010 through phased-in manner
China may designate an unlimited
airlines as of 1 August 2007; US may
designate an unlimited airlines on Route
B as of 25 March 2011; no limitation on
designation to China Zone 3
Access points
Route A (combination and all cargo
services): US airlines - 5 points in
China; Chinese airlines - 12 points in
the US. Route B (all cargo services):
any points in the US or China, via any
intermediate points, and beyond to any
points outside China or US.
Between any point in China and
any point in the US open to
scheduled international services;
US airlines are allowed to set up
cargo hubs within China
Same as 2004 Protocol
Capacity/frequency
54 weekly frequencies for each side by
1 April 2001 through phased-in
manner.
249 weekly frequencies for each
side by 2010 through phased-in
manner; no frequency limitations
for points in China Zone 3
An additional 70 weekly passenger
frequencies to China Zone 1 and Zone 2
by each side by March 2012; no
frequency limitations for cargo as of
March 2011; no frequency limitation
for points in China Zone 3
Code Sharing
Code sharing between designated
Chinese and US airlines are allowed
between pre-determined points
Domestic, bilateral and third-
country code sharing were allowed. Additional code share arrangements
Tariffs Double approval Double-disapproval Double-disapproval
Source: US Department of State, 1999, 2004, 2007.
Note: Based on China-US ASA in 1999, 2004, and 2007
8It is noteworthy that Chinese aviation market was divided into three zones when details of
frequencies were specified, as can be seen in table 2. Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou made up
Zone 1, points in eastern and coastal regions ( Anhui, Fujian, Guangdong (except Guangzhou), Hebei,
Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Shangdong, Shanxi, Tianjin, and Zhejiang) were designated
as Zone 2, and points in central, western and northeast regions, ( Chongqing, Gansu, Guangxi,
Guizhou, Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia, Jilin, Liaoning, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Tibet,
Xinjiang and Yunnan, plus Hainan Island) made up as Zone 3. Interestingly, such a geographic
division is only applied to the Chinese market; the US was seen as a single market of many potential
city markets. The classification is mainly based on the different stages of economic development
where Zone 1 is the most developed region in China followed by Zone 2, while Zone 3 is the least
developed region and the arrangement reflected CAAC’s policy of giving special international air
transport support to the western, northeast and central regions, as described in Section 2. So
there was a 249-frequency cap in Zone 1 and Zone 2, with no limitation at all for any operations in
Zone 3. Moreover, China’s outbound traffic is mainly concentrated in Beijing, Shanghai, and
Guangzhou. Limiting frequencies to those cities protected the operations of Chinese airlines.
There are several other important aspects of the 2004 Protocol. It was the first time that
foreign carriers were allowed to set up cargo hubs in China with full traffic rights. The
relaxation on pricing control from double-approval to double-disapproval was unusual for
China, given the Chinese legacy of market regulation and the weak financial performance of
its major airlines. Furthermore, domestic, bilateral and third-country code-sharing were
allowed though third country code-sharing of either Party needs to be agreed by airlines of the other
Party, and is still subject to government approval on a case-by-case basis. Another important
development not visible in Table 2 is that restrictions on commercial activities, including
change of gauge and self-handling were relaxed in phased-in manner (US Department of
State, 2004). Although the 2004 Protocol was not a full “Open Skies” that the US had aimed
at, it was the most liberal agreement China had ever signed with a major trading partner and
was described as a “Free Skies” deal by the US (Field, 2004) since it effectively created a
regional “Open Skies” with China (Beane, 2007).
Additionally, an innovation of the 2004 Protocol was that it outlined a timetable for further
discussions which were scheduled to be held in 2006 (US Department of State, 2004), hence
becoming an obligation for the Chinese side. After further rounds of bargaining, the ASA
was revised in 2007, further removing restrictions on designation, capacity and cargo
operations, while retaining essential restrictions about charter operations, third-country code-
9sharing and passenger 5th traffic rights (US Department of State, 2007). The entries in Table
2 show that designation would be liberalized for China as of 1 August 2007 and the same
would apply to the US on Route B staring from March 2011. On the basis of the 2004
capacity entitlement, an additional 70 weekly passenger frequencies to China Zone 1 and
Zone 2 could be added by each side by March 2012, while the cargo frequency cap would be
removed as of March 2011. Operations to China Zone 3 would be fully liberalized, i.e. no
limitations on either designation or frequencies for both sides. Furthermore, both sides
acknowledged their mutual, ultimate objective as the full liberalization of their bilateral air
transport market, and also promised to work together with each other to reach a new
agreement as soon as possible (US Department of State, 2007).
4. China’s Considerations in Reaching the 2004 and 2007 Protocols
Acknowledging the very substantial differences in the scale of the airlines as well as in the
economic and policy systems of the two nations involved, it is perhaps surprising that the
changes in the ASAs outlined above have been achieved in such a short time. The aspirations
of the US side here seem easier to understand as they have adopted a consistent stance on
open skies in ASA negotiations. However, insight on China’s position is less well developed.
This Section analyses China’s considerations in reaching the 2004 and 2007 protocols based
on CAAC’s international air transport policy as outlined in Section 2.
A first step in understanding the negotiations, and their outcome, requires an understanding
of the political context at the time. Serving China’s political and diplomatic needs, and
enhancing China-US national relations, both appear to be an important considerations for
China in reaching the 2004 and 2007 Protocols. A strong bilateral relationship with the US
was seen at the time a top priority for China, and traffic rights arrangements played an
important part of the country’s overall diplomacy policies. Therefore, in the process of
opening up its international air transport market, China appeared to have seen liberalization
arrangements with the US at the top of its agenda, in the belief that a more liberal bilateral air
transport market would promote greater exchanges of people and goods, and so would lay a
more solid foundation for further enhancing bilateral national relations. That policy stance
reflected China’s position at that time as it sought WTO membership; it may have believed
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that the US’s support would be of paramount importance to achieve such a target (Prime,
2002). Furthermore, China was seeking to be elected as Part 1 member of the ICAO Council
and any positive responses to ICAO’s calls for liberalization would be helpful. As a matter of
fact, China obtained its Part 1 membership in October 2004 (Xinhua, 2004), which, together
with the 2004 Protocol, was among the most eye-catching achievements in China’s aviation
history.
A different political context surrounded the CAAC’s approach to further liberalisation from
2006 inwards, as air transport was, for the first time, brought into the US-China Strategic
Economic Dialogue (SED3) framework at the US’s request。 The SED was initiated in 2006
by US President George W. Bush and Chinese President Hu Jintao, representing the highest-
level bilateral forum between the two nations. An important objective of the SED is to
provide a platform for senior officials to meet regularly for discussions of issues of strategic
importance to both countries. By including traffic rights into SED negotiations the US was
trying to overcome difficulties it believed it faced at the industry level (Williams, 2009).
This was an influence upon the 2007 Protocol, as the aviation negotiations were under a sort
of obligation to deliver some meaningful achievements in this broad strategic context
(Russell, 2007). At the time bilateral air talks were specially timed by both sides with the aim
of fitting any possible conclusions of agreements into the SED programme (Russell, 2007).
Schofield (2007) argued that rights in aviation might even have been intentionally sacrificed
to ensure US concessions in other areas, because when looked at in isolation, the Chinese
were not well placed to achieve many positive gains from opening up their market further to
US airlines.
A second consideration for China in the 2004 and 2007 Protocol negotiations involved
concerns surrounding national development policy. Since 1999 the US had become China’s
largest trading partner, while China was evolved as the US’s fifth largest trading partner in
2004, and its third largest one in 2007 (World Bank, 2015). From the perspective of
economic development, it was imperative for China to accelerate its aviation liberalization to
attract more US investment and further strengthen trade ties. China was one of very few
US’s major trading partners that had not signed an Open Skies agreement with it (DOS,
2011). Besides, China’s trade volume was projected to increase rapidly and continuously in
3 US-China Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) was renamed as US-China Strategic and Economic
Dialogue (SE&D) in 2009.
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years ahead and aviation was expected to play a critical role in that trade. For instance, the
liberal cargo traffic rights were intended to support China’s foreign trade and its export-
oriented economy. As Chinese cargo carriers were traditionally weak and were unable to
build cargo hubs themselves, the “cargo hub” clause of the 2004 Protocol aimed at
encouraging US cargo operators to establish their hubs in China, so as to make China’s
overall investment, economic and trade environment more attractive. A study conducted by
US Bureau of Transport Statistics (BTS) (2004) revealed that air freight was the fastest
growing segment of the US cargo industry, and expansion of aviation opportunities between
the two nations could facilitate export of US high tech and high-value goods to China. For
China, the aviation relationship and cooperation with the US was vital, since further
development of parts of Chinese industry still relied on its support and assistance of advanced
US technology. It would also mean that more US airlines, businesses and travellers could
take advantage of the growing trade between the two economies (HKTDC, 2004). Therefore,
the US pushed its counterpart really hard through all negotiations on traffic rights
arrangements, as an important part of the overall bilateral aviation relations, while the CAAC
had a range of reasons to consider the US claims seriously.
Regional and urban considerations entered the Chinese perspective at this time as well. At the
regional scale, the fully liberalized arrangements in China Zone 3 were designed to support
China’s attempt to boost regional economic and social advancement via the “West
Development” and “Rejuvenation of the Northeast Region” strategies. Likewise, provincial
governments, aiming at promoting local economy and inward investment through attracting
more international flights, also pushed hard for further liberalization. In urban areas, major
Chinese airports, especially those who have been aspired to become main hubs, were looking
forward to as many international flights as possible, with those linking the US regarded as
their top priority, no matter they would be operated by Chinese airlines or US carriers.
The concern with hubs entered the 2004 and 2007 negotiations as a desire to prevent traffic
diversion to third countries. Wolf (2001) argues that regulation of an air transport market
generates spill-over effects to other markets that are interconnected by route networks.
Traffic diversion benefits countries which have already liberalized their air links not only on
routes that are substitutes for the regulated one within the same market, but also in other
markets. Consequently, a country, if still executing regulation with liberalized interconnected
markets, runs the risk that its air links degenerate to merely spokes of hub operations in other
countries. Such effects appear to have started to unfold in China. By the end of 2003, US had
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Open Skies agreements with ten Asian economies, including South Korea, Japan,
Singapore, Malaysia, and Taiwan (DOS, 2011). These Open Skies deals played an important
role in helping US carriers to develop their networks in the Asia Pacific region which had
implications for the hub roles of certain airports. For instance, Korean Air and Japan Airlines
Cargo operated between China and the US via Tokyo and Seoul respectively, using 6th traffic
rights. In passenger traffic, Japan’s Tokyo Narita airport and Korea’s Incheon airport are well
ahead of Chinese airports in hub competition. Such an advantage may be partly attributed to
their more liberal international air transport policies, especially with the US, while China’s
more restrictive traffic rights regime up to 2004 may have facilitated hub building at these
airports. Thus, one important consideration in China’s approach to negotiations may have
been to reduce third country traffic diversion and so support the industry’s own hub building
initiatives.
A final factor here might have been a decision by China to match attitudes to the global
liberalization trend. Instead of waiting for its “closed door” to be knocked open, the industry
regulator may have seen an opportunity to create stronger, more competitive and experienced
airlines by exposing them to the fierce and head-to-head competition with their foreign
counterparts.
5. The Impacts of the 2004 and 2007 Protocols
Most studies find that liberalisation of bilaterals triggered substantial traffic growth (Gomez-
Ibanez and Morgan, 1984; Dresner and Windle, 1995; Marlin, 1995; Maillebiau and Hansen,
1995; Piermartini and Rousova, 2008; Warnock-Smith and Morrell, 2008). Table 3 shows
that China-US market follows the same pattern. The race among US airlines to get into the
Chinese market was already heated before the 2004 Protocol was signed. Delta, American
and Continental finally won the battle and got the new designations, while the incumbents
also benefited by either launching new routes or increasing frequencies. Competition within
the US for the additional 111 weekly cargo frequencies was even more intense as the
Department of Transportation (DoT) received applications for more than 200 flights (Caijing,
2004). Finally, Fedex managed to increase its weekly flights by six and started hub building
in Guangzhou. Polar Air Cargo launched a new all-cargo service as well. As to the Chinese
airline industry, except for very few prospective entrants, such as Shanghai International
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Cargo, Yangtze River Express and Hainan Airlines, who benefited directly from this deal by
obtaining China-US route licences, the general sentiment was panic. In the week following
the agreement’s signing, both China Eastern and China Southern saw their stock price diving,
while that of their major US counterparts shooting up (Caijing, 2004).
Table 3 Evolution of number of passenger airlines and airport pairs in the China-US
market
Year
Number of
Airlines Airport pairs
China US Total
one
airline
only
by
Chinese
carriers
one
airline
only
by US
carriers
one
airline
only
2001 3 2 7 5 4 4 4 4
2002 3 1 5 3 4 4 2 2
2003 3 1 7 6 6 6 2 2
2004 3 1 8 7 6 6 3 3
2005 3 2 9 8 5 5 5 5
2006 3 3 9 7 5 5 5 4
2007 3 3 11 9 6 6 6 5
2008 4 4 13 11 7 7 7 6
2009 4 5 15 13 7 7 9 8
2010 4 4 14 10 7 7 9 7
2011 4 4 16 11 7 7 12 9
2012 4 3 16 11 8 8 11 8
2013 4 3 18 12 10 10 12 9
2014 4 4 22 14 14 14 15 12
Note: The data are for the direct flights in the China-US market.
Source: Compiled by the authors from OAG database.
Given access to more recent data it is now possible to explore the effect of this two stage
liberalization on the market as it was operating in 2014. The impact of liberalization can be
charted via the change in the number of airlines, and the city pairs flown. Table 3 shows that
total number of designated airlines operating in the China-US market doubled from four in
2004 to eight in 2014 with the US recording the largest increase. Nevertheless, as airlines are
competing mostly in the city-pair or airport-pair markets4, increased number of players does
not necessarily mean more intensive competition. In fact the number of airport-pairs served in
4 “Airport-pair” is defined in this paper as two airports served by scheduled non-stop flights, with at
least two weekly frequencies.
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the China-US market increased dramatically from 8 in 2004 to 22 in 2014, and those served
by more than one carrier increased from 1 in 2004 to 8 in 2014. While in the US, the rule of
traffic right allocation is based on the best public interest, Table 3 clearly shows that China
follows “one route, one airline” policy, so that only one airline from China is allowed to
serve a route in the China-US market. The arrangement seems to protect Chinese airlines
from internal competition, while boosting the potential of each US city market for the
designated carrier.
Over half of the airport-pair markets were served by one airline only, which might suggest a
lack of local competition as a result of the national liberalization. However, given the
complexity of the domestic networks in both China and the US, connecting passengers
account for a big share of the total traffic on each city pair. So in essence the routes
themselves are in competition. As an illustration, a passenger travelling from Philadelphia to
Beijing (where no direct flights are available), may travel through an east coast hub by
connecting with United from Washington (IAD), Air China from New York (JFK) or
Continental from Newark (EWR), or through the central region by travelling with United or
American Airlines from Chicago (ORD). All the five options are of equal convenience, thus
competing with each other for the passenger in question. Therefore, more routes served mean
more choices for the public, and consequently increased competition among airlines.
Table 4 further shows the total number of weekly frequencies increased from 53 in 2004 to
251 in 2014 while the number of seats supplied in the market increased from 17,174 to
71,074 during the same period, or a 15.3% average annual growth, as opposed to 2.4% annual
growth rate between 2001 to 2004. It is worth pointing out that US carriers’ share of weekly
seats declined substantially between 2002 and 2004. This is mainly due to a change in
Northwest’s Asian strategy. It operated 13 direct flights per week between US and China
before the 11th September 2001 attacks, but in 2002 all of them were routed via Tokyo using
5th traffic rights. Such a shift in operations had great impact on the total seats supplied by the
US carriers as a whole, as Northwest was a major player in the China-US market. Another
reason was that the September 2001 attacks led to a significant market contraction, especially
from the US side.
The positive gain for the US out of the liberalization can be seen after 2004 as US carriers
reversed Chinese airlines’ dominant position by wining 54% of the market share in 2005 in
terms of weekly seats, which represented 78% growth rate against the previous year, while
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the growth rate for Chinese airlines was a mere 2%. US carriers’ dominant position persisted
in the next few years with 2011 witnessed the largest (34 percentage points) between the two
in terms of weekly seats. What is also worth mentioning is that the scope provided by the
2007 Protocol helped the US airlines withstand the impact of the global financial crisis as
traffic growth in the China-US market was still positive growth in 2008, as opposed to a
traffic decrease of over 15% in the US international market overall (DOT, 2008). For
Chinese airlines there was a reduction in weekly seats between 2007 and 2009. Nevertheless,
the Chinese side started to catch up from 2009 and by 2014, the market share of Chinese
airlines in terms of weekly seats was equal with that of their US counterparts. A key reason
behind the Chinese carriers’ improvement of performance was that the number of Chinese
passengers travelling to the US has increased dramatically in the past few years. When the
initial decisions on liberalization were taken in 2004, 1.3 million US nationals travelled to
China which was over six times greater than the number of Chinese travellers moving in the
opposite direction (CNTA, 2005). Rapid economic growth in China, along with a relaxation
of visa regulations for Chinese nationals has almost equalised the two flows. In 2013, the
number of Chinese nationals travelling to the US increased to 1.97 million which was very
close to the number (2.09 million) of US nationals travelled to China (CNTA, 2014). As
Chinese travellers are more likely to fly with their home carriers, which have local marketing,
culture and language advantages compared to the US airlines, the increased number of
Chinese tourists certainly helped Chinese carriers expand their share of the China-US market.
A constraint on the US share of the Chinese market is the fact that the vast majority of US
carriers’ operations in China were limited to Beijing and Shanghai, as shown in Figure 1.
Chengdu was the only city outside of Beijing and Shanghai directly served by a US carrier
with 3 weekly flights operated by United Airlines from San Francisco in 2014. By contrast,
Figure 2 shows that airports in the US served by Chinese airlines expanded from the
traditional destinations in Los Angeles and San Francisco to now include Boston, Honolulu,
Washington, Houston, New York, Chicago, and Seattle. Such change of landscape benefits
Chinese airlines as most of the US airports served by Chinese airlines have spare capacity,
while the airports in Beijing and Shanghai are heavily congested and it is difficult to obtain
additional slots, hence limiting US carriers’ ability to expand capacity in the Chinese market.
16
Figure 1 US carriers’ seat capacity distribution at Chinese airports from 2001 and 2014
Note: CTU=Chengdu International Airport; PEK=Beijing International Airport;
PVG=Shanghai Pudong International Airport. Source: OAG database.
Figure 2 Chinese carriers’ seat capacity distribution at US airports from 2001 and 2014
Note: BOS=Boston airport; HNL=Honolulu airport: IAD: Washington Dulles airport;
IAH=Houston George Bush airport; JFK=New York John F Kennedy airport; LAX=Los
Angel airport; ORD=Chicago O’Hare airport; SEA=Seattle airport; SFO=San Francisco
airport. Source: OAG database.
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Though US carriers were given unrestricted traffic rights to serve airports in China’s more
remote Zone 3 in 2007, US carriers appear to be unenthusiastic about serving airports outside
of Beijing and Shanghai. This is understandable as most of the outbound traffic to the US is
concentrated in Beijing and Shanghai which makes direct flights from other cities to the US
not economically viable. As will be discussed below, these markets can also be served via
code–share flights through Tokyo, Seoul and Hong Kong. Consequently, in recent years US
carriers only managed to increase their weekly frequencies to China from 109 in 2011 to 129
in 2014 (see Table 4), while their Chinese rivals’ weekly frequencies have more than doubled
from 51 in 2011 to 122 in 2014. To summarize, a market boom driven by an increasing
number of Chinese tourists, coupled with US carriers’ difficulties of expanding capacity in
the Chinese market, has resulted in US carriers gradually losing market share to their Chinese
rivals. Such outcomes may have reflected CAAC’s forward thinking when negotiating the
2004 and 2007 Protocols, especially as the initial impacts were firmly biased toward the US.
The cost of airfares is of course a major consideration in liberalization policies. Figure 3
shows monthly average ticket prices charged by Chinese and US carriers in the China-US
market from 2008. These were actual prices charged extracted from IATA PaxIS database.
As the full force of liberalization began to be felt, the fares charged by the Chinese carriers
were almost 20% lower than their US counterparts during most of the period from January
2008 to March 2012. Nevertheless, fares charged by Chinese airlines have started to rise
since April 2012. Between June 2012 and September 2012, the fares charged by Chinese
carriers were on a par with their US counterparts, suggesting the improvement of financial
performance of Chinese airlines.
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Figure 3 Average fares (US$) of Chinese and US airlines in the China-US market
Source: PaxIS database
As previously discussed, an important consideration of China to liberalize its air transport
market was to prevent third-country traffic diversion. However, Figure 4 reveals that
passenger leakage to other hubs has worsened in the past few years. Passengers travelling in
the China-US market more than doubled from 1.3 million in 2008 to 2.7 million in 2013
according to PaxIS database. In 2008, 14% of passengers travelling between China and the
US were “lost” to other countries, of which over 97% connected at Tokyo, Seoul and Hong
Kong. By 2013 the ratio of passenger leakage to a third country increased to 20%, of which
86% passengers were diverted through Seoul, Hong Kong and Tokyo. While Hong Kong is a
Special Administrative Region of China, the loss of traffic to Seoul and Tokyo is an alarming
finding for Chinese airports, whose hub building strategy has been seriously challenged.
Such a high ratio of traffic leakage may be due to the following reasons. One is that US
airlines traditionally use Tokyo as a hub for Asia Pacific traffic. Another reason is that
airlines in Japan and Korea provide higher frequencies to more non-stop destinations in the
US at lower prices than their Chinese counterparts (Fu et al, 2015), hence attracting
substantial Chinese passengers transferring at Incheon and Narita.
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Figure 4. Traffic diversion in 2008 and 2013 in the China – US market
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Table 4 Development of weekly frequencies & weekly seats in the China-US market
Total
Chinese
carriers
Share of
Chinese
Carrier
US
carriers
Share of
US
Carriers
Total
Chinese
carriers
Share of
Chinese
Carrier
US
carriers
Share of
US
Carriers
2001 45 22 49% 23 51% 16,005 7,495 47% 8,510 53%
2002 37 21 57% 16 43% 12,612 7,226 57% 5,386 43%
2003 22 15 68% 8 36% 6,952 4,418 64% 2,534 36%
2004 53 30 57% 23 43% 17,174 10,238 60% 6,936 40%
2005 70 31 44% 39 56% 22,798 10,468 46% 12,330 54%
2006 83 37 45% 47 57% 25,960 11,801 45% 14,159 55%
2007 95 41 43% 54 57% 30,485 13,016 43% 17,469 57%
2008 102 40 39% 62 61% 32,436 12,890 40% 19,546 60%
2009 112 41 37% 71 63% 35,582 12,798 36% 22,784 64%
2010 131 48 37% 83 63% 40,140 14,999 37% 25,142 63%
2011 160 51 32% 109 68% 47,278 15,585 33% 31,693 67%
2012 171 64 37% 106 62% 48,378 19,112 40% 29,267 60%
2013 197 81 41% 116 59% 56,747 25,313 45% 31,434 55%
2014 251 122 49% 129 51% 71,074 35,371 50% 35,703 50%
Year
Weekly Frequency Weekly Seats
Note: the data are based on the first week of July in each year for direct passenger flights in the
China-US market. Source: OAG database.
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The increasing traffic diversion through Japan and Korea makes US’s demand for more
liberal arrangements on third-country code-sharing unacceptable to China (Fu et al, 2015).
Both Japan and Korea have strong and mature networks serving China. Code-sharing with
airlines in both countries enables US carriers to bypass Chinese frequency restrictions, and at
the same time expand their presence in China without launching new routes. Those
arrangements mean that there are difficulties facing China’s policy of developing direct
international air links to the US from China’s secondary cities. Japan and Korea could also
benefit from such operations, as the US could help them fill their aircraft by supplying
transfer passengers. This would help them enhance their competitiveness on the China-Japan
and China-Korea routes respectively, and further strengthen their advantages as Asian hubs.
6. Summary and Conclusions
Analysis shows that the 2004 and the 2007 Air Services Agreement Protocols have been
associated with a profound impact on the China-US market. The two Protocols, along with
the rapid economic expansion of China and its trade link with the US have facilitated
phenomenal traffic growth, with frequency and seat capacity dramatically increased over
their respective 2003 figures. At the same time, the level of competition appears to have
intensified with the number of airlines in service increased, and the number of non-stop
routes expanded dramatically. Although most of the routes are still operated by a single
carrier, passengers have much more choice in terms of both airlines and routing. This is
particularly so for the US where a hub-and-spoke network generally determines that the
majority of traffic is transported through specific connections; one route added to a hub
would add a number of routing options.
While US carriers made substantial gains in capturing market share from their Chinese
counterparts in the first few years of liberalization, Chinese airlines have closed the gap
quickly since 2010. Their financial performance in the China-US market has also improved
over time. The changing competitive landscape in the China-US market is attributed to two
factors. One is due to the rapid increase of Chinese outbound tourists to the US. The other is
that Chinese airlines fly from Beijing and Shanghai to a large number of US airports, most of
which still have spare capacity, while US carriers’ operations in China are highly
concentrated at capacity constrained airports in Beijing and Shanghai. Therefore, US carriers
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find it difficult to benefit from the booming China-US market by deploying more capacity on
these routes. However, such a situation may change when Beijing’s second airport schedules
to opens in 2019. With planned capacity of 72 million passengers a year by 2025 and over
100 million passengers in the longer term, the new airport will add abundant capacity to the
Beijing area5 (Beijing New Airport Construction Headquarters, 2015). As a result of the relief
of capacity constraints, US carriers may be able to schedule more flights to Beijing. For
Chinese airlines, it is imperative for them to improve their underlying competitiveness in
order to sustain their advantages in the China-US market.
This study also reveals that China’s hub-building initiatives are seriously challenged by
competing hubs in Seoul and Tokyo which have diverted substantial number of passengers in
the China-US markets. A strategy which may be considered by Chinese airlines is to form
joint ventures with their US counterparts. Such cooperation would allow airlines in China and
the US to coordinate their routes, schedules, products and fares, which would, at least in
theory, bring costs down, rationalise capacity input and improve competitive strength for both
sides. If such benefits can be passed on to passengers by offering them lower fares or more
value added products and services, this may make connecting flights via Seoul and Tokyo
less attr-active. Furthermore, joint ventures may be more important to the Chinese side, since
diverted traffic, generally speaking, is a price-sensitive segment, which constitutes the bulk of
customers for Chinese airlines. Nevertheless, full joint ventures require anti-trust immunity
from US Government which may not be granted until a China-US open skies agreement is
signed to ensure consolidation is not anti-competitive. Having said that, the recent
announcement of strategic partnership6 between Delta and China Easter seems to represent a
5 Beijing’s existing airport (Beijing Capital International Airport) handled 84 million passengers in
2014 (CAAC, 2015).
6 Delta and China Eastern announced on 27 Jul 2015 that Delta is to acquire a 3.55% stake in China
Eastern for USD450 million. Both airlines announced that:
 "the parties will take advantage of their respective route networks, flight services, relevant
businesses and advantageous resources to fully connect the world's two top economies as
well as two top air transportation markets."
 "The parties wish, through excellent operation and international cooperation, to optimise
customer experience, enhance the parties' global competitiveness and promotes the
development and revenue growth of both parties."
 "We share a vision that will create the most profitable, enduring franchise between the U.S.
and China, with world-class customer service" (CAPA, 2015)
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major step towards developing deeper and more powerful relationships (CAPA, 2015). Such
issues may have to be considered in future negotiations between China and the US in order to
create a win-win outcome for both countries.
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